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Abstract
Much research on the societal consequences of climate change has focused on inaction, seeking to explain why societies
and individuals do not change according to experts’ recommendations. In this qualitative study, we instead consider peo‐
ple who have changed their behaviour for the sake of the climate: They have stopped travelling by air. We first asked them
to elaborate their rationales for the behaviour change. Then, using topos theory to find thought structures, we analysed
their 673 open‐text answers. Several themes emerged, which together can be regarded as a process of change. Increased
knowledge, primarily narrated as a process by which latent knowledge was transformed into insight, through experience
or emotional distress, was important. Contrary to certain claims in the literature, fear stimulated change of behaviour for
many in this group. Climate change was framed as a moral issue, requiring acts of conscience. Children were invoked as
educators and moral guides. Role models and a supportive social context played an important part. Alternatives to flying
were brought forward as a motive to refrain from flying. Only a few mentioned shame as momentous. Instead, stopping
travelling by air invoked a feeling of agency and responsibility, and could also result in a positive sensation.
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1. Introduction
Although the UN has declared this the Decade of Action,
during which the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) should be met, progress toward SDG No. 13—
“Take urgent action to combat climate change”—has
been slow. Much research has been dedicated to under‐
standing this inertia (Hulme, 2009; Oreskes & Conway,
2010). One prominent explanation for why people fail
to act on the knowledge they possess has been char‐
acterised as the knowledge‐action gap. This gap has
spurred research in many fields, including media and
communication studies (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002;
Moser & Dilling, 2011), anthropology (Norgaard, 2011),
and psychology (Gifford, 2011). An alternate explana‐
tion characterises climate change as a “wicked problem”
(Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012), laden with
goal conflicts. Goal conflicts are at play on several levels,
from themicro to macro. For instance, some of the SDGs
actually stand in conflict with each other when more
precisely articulated (Nilsson, Griggs, & Visbeck, 2016).
On the level of individuals, the ambition to lead a climate‐
friendly lifemay stand in conflictwith eating the foodone
loves or maintaining international friendships.
We are interested in how individuals and societies
manage goal conflicts and overcome the inertia of
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inaction concerning climate change. Travelling by air
was chosen as a distinctive case, as flying typically
presents an individual with several, potentially painful
goal conflicts. Considering Swedes who stopped or dras‐
tically reduced their amount of travel by air because
of stated concerns about climate change, we analyse
the thought structures that they report motivated their
decisions. The analysis is qualitative and the results
are not generalizable. Our interest is the particular and
non‐representative group that overcame inertia and
changed behaviour. In the Swedish population as a
whole, very few have made this decision. In a general
survey of Swedes and their attitudes toward climate and
environmental issues, 14% said they had stopped flying
for climate reasons in 2019 (Persson, 2020). However,
studying this particular group illuminates the arguments
that these people brought forward as they curtailed
flights, and this, in turn, can give important insights into
the work of further limiting emissions from commercial
air travel.
To date, very few studies look specifically at peo‐
ple who have eliminated air travel because of concern
about climate change. Jacobson, Åkerman, Giusti, and
Bhowmik (2020) conducted interviews with a total of
25 “quitters,” “reducers,” and “non‐reducers” and found
phases and components of a process of transformation.
Jacobson et al. (2020) show that internalised knowledge
about climate change and the impact of air travel is cru‐
cial for instigating behavioural change. To investigate the
role of values, Büchs (2017) likewise made interviews
with people who voluntarily reduced flying. In a recent
study,Mkono andHughes (2020) have analysed howpeo‐
ple relate to flying on social media, gathering examples
of online discourse. They found that eco‐guilt and eco‐
shame are common; their study objects, however, in gen‐
eral, did not cease travelling by air. The literature on
people who continue flying despite their otherwise sus‐
tainable values is larger (e.g., Cohen & Higham, 2011;
Juvan&Dolnicar, 2014; Kroesen, 2013;McDonald, Oates,
Thyne, Timmis, & Carlile, 2015).
As a situated understanding of flying is important
for individual motives, the next section relates to the
Swedish context. The theoretical underpinning of our
research design is discussed in Section 3, followed by a
description of the methodology in Section 4. Section 5
details our empirical findings and Section 6 discusses the
array of findings in relation to each other.
2. Flying and Climate Change in Sweden: Some Context
Air travel as an issue related to climate change is not new.
The first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) report on the topic was published in 1999 (Penner,
Lister, Griggs, Dokken, & McFarland, 1999). As a public
topic for people in general, however, it was probably not
an issue until climate change gained wider attention in
the media. This occurred markedly in 2007, with news
around the publication of the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report and Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth win‐
ning an Oscar, and even more so in 2009, with the
hacked email from East Anglia and the COP15 meeting
in Copenhagen (Boykoff, 2010).
In the Swedish context, early well‐known exam‐
ples of people who stopped flying include the climate
researcher Kevin Anderson, and opera singer Malena
Ernman, better known to international audiences as
the mother of Greta Thunberg (Anderson, Andersson,
Ferry, Ernman, & Hedberg, 2017; Ernman & Thunberg,
2018). By 2018, the Swedish public sphere saw an exten‐
sive discussion on flying habits and climate change.
Occurring close in time but acting separately, three pub‐
lic figures published columns in the daily press detail‐
ing their personal struggles with flying. They testified to
the goal‐conflicts and troubled consciences they experi‐
enced when considering the large carbon dioxide emis‐
sions from trips they took to Kenya, Cuba, or Italy
(Hadley Kamptz, 2018; Liljestrand, 2018; Mosskin, 2018).
An intense and prolonged debate on flying in general and
leisurely flying in particular followed, and to some extent
continues in Sweden. The term ‘flight shame’ emerged,
not as a precise scientific description of a psychologi‐
cal reaction, but as a loose and click‐friendly response
to an emotional discourse in which social media was
key. In early 2019, an anonymous Instagram account
began shaming so‐called influencers who flew exten‐
sively and at the same time declared an interest in cli‐
mate issues; to post pictures of long‐distance trips on
Facebook was no longer comme il faut. Most organi‐
sed efforts to stimulate decreased flying were, how‐
ever, supportive, such as the We Stay on the Ground
movement. Their campaign on Facebook is also organ‐
ised around positive examples and avoids shaming, even
though it engages with moral issues. Still, ‘flight shame,’
translated from Swedish, began circulating internation‐
ally in debates (Eriksson, Pargman, Robèrt, & Laaksolahti,
2020; Gössling, Humpe, & Bausch, 2020). The phrase
established a common understanding that this particu‐
lar mobility discussion was tightly coupled with one of
the most difficult human emotions: shame.
Furthermore, the record‐breaking Summer of 2018
saw extreme temperatures and extensive forest fires
in Sweden. In the Fall, as the new school term began,
the then 15‐year‐old Greta Thunberg started her School
Strike for Climate under the hashtag #FridaysForFuture.
It soon resulted in a social movement of global propor‐
tions (Wahlström, Kocyba, De Vydt, & de Moor, 2019).
Mainstream and social media coverage increased dra‐
matically (Boulianne, Lalancette, & Ilkiw, 2020; Mahl,
Brüggeman, Guenther, & De Silva‐Schmidt, 2020). It was
in this national context that our survey was carried out.
3. Theoretical Basis andMethodological Starting Points
Our main interest is to understand the circumstances
that allow people to change their behaviour with regards
to climate change. A starting point is the hypothesis
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that people orient and motivate action in dialogue
with others, always against the background of a social
context, but also through an internal dialogue where
people negotiate with themselves. From a rhetorical
perspective, this sort of human meaning‐making is lin‐
guistic and argumentative. When we want to under‐
stand what enables action, or promotes inaction, we
can look at how someone reasons or argues (this does
not exclude the existence of other, non‐linguistic dimen‐
sions). This rhetorical perspective is particularly rele‐
vant in issues where there is tension between knowl‐
edge and action, between different important values, or
between short‐term and long‐term goals. In A Rhetoric
of Motives, Burke (1969) argues that meaning‐making in
such matters takes place through identification and divi‐
sion. Burke (1969) proposes that people act based on
how they identify and separate themselves from other
people, ideas, thought systems, events, and things, and
that these identifications also affect what people con‐
sider to be true and relevant. Burke (1984) uses the term
motives to describe how people understand, explain, jus‐
tify, excuse, or rationalize their actions to others and
themselves, but also as “shorthand descriptions for cer‐
tain typical patterns of discrepant and conflicting stimuli”
(Burke, 1984, p. 30). Motives, according to Burke (1969),
are not static. New knowledge, other social contexts,
meetings, and dialogues can change how people per‐
ceive their moral situation and force or invite them into
new patterns of meaning.
A prime assumption of rhetorical theory, already
identified in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, is that people want to
be consistent and avoid contradictions. If people act
against their intention or knowledge, or in a manner that
contradicts their morals, they experience unease, which
Festinger (1957) later called “cognitive dissonance.” The
occurrence of cognitive dissonance has been observed
also in tourism studies, where for example Kroesen
(2013) has usedQ‐methodology to study arguments used
to overcome the discomfort of acting against knowledge.
Likewise, Juvan and Dolnicar (2014) explore justifications
concerning the discomfort of unsustainable tourism.
The drive to be consistent or coherent means that
people strive to rationalize their behaviour. This ratio‐
nalization, argumentation, or justification takes place in
an inner dialogue, which Perelman and Olbrechts‐Tyteca
(1969) called “deliberation intime” in French. In our study,
the action originally causing the cognitive dissonance—
travelling by air despite knowing its negative effect on
climate—was abandoned and thus few motives relate to
justification. Instead, cognitive dissonance is revealed as
a backdrop to behavioural change. This differs frommost
studies that engage with cognitive dissonance.
We focus on the thought structures that can be
deduced from the arguments people use when explain‐
ing their motives, the structures by which they create
and display coherence between knowledge and action.
We are particularly interested in the prototypical think‐
ing structure behind recurrent arguments used to explain
a certain action. In rhetorical theory, this is called topoi
(topos in singular). Topos theory, with its roots in ancient
sophistry, was articulated by Aristotle in his Topica and
Rhetorica. It was then explored and developed by sev‐
eral rhetoricians, including Cicero and Giambattista Vico.
We start from the understanding of topos developed
in the 20th century by Perelman and Olbrechts‐Tyteca
(1969), which gives an ideal conceptual frame for study‐
ing and describing rhetorical negotiation between mul‐
tiple perspectives. The theory thus offers a methodol‐
ogy akin to, but still significantly different from, discourse
analysis as exemplified by Foucault or frame analysis as
practised by Goffman, since we look for specific traits
within the material: namely, arguments that motivate
the action and create meaning for the individual.
The theory of topos does not see reasoning as iso‐
lated from context. Even the internal dialogue takes
place between topoi that have been developed and are
perceived as valid in a social context. People use the
arguments that have the potential to be accepted and
make sense in the context they belong to or want to
belong to. These social traits of reasoning have recently
been observed also in psychology as motivated reason‐
ing or cultural cognition, and challenge the enlighten‐
ment idea of rationality based on knowledge (Kahan,
2015; Mercier & Sperber, 2017). In short, arguments are
socially situated and also temporally and spatially depen‐
dent. Recurring types of argument can still be sorted
into categories and described, albeit knowing that these
categories and descriptions are contingent. We cannot
expect to find universally valid or fully delimited topoi,
or even a limited number of them.
To discern and describe this meaning‐making we
use phenomenography, a theory developed within ped‐
agogy, with an empirical and interpretivist perspective
(Marton, 1986; Marton & Booth, 1997; Svensson, 1997).
A basic assumption in phenomenography is that learning
and meaning‐making manifest themselves in many ways
and that there is a value in discerning, describing, and
understanding this variety. Phenomenography is also a
methodology for qualitatively studying different ways of
experiencing or thinking about something and describing
a range or repertoire of possible approaches. This harmo‐
nizes well with topical analysis.
4. Method
This study applied a mixed qualitative method includ‐
ing several steps. We used a survey to collect free‐text
answers. The respondentswere self‐recruited froma spe‐
cial group, namely people who stopped flying because of
concern about climate change. In the free‐text answers,
we distinguished recurring types of arguments motivat‐
ing behavioural change. These types constitute differ‐
ent topoi. Each discernible topos received a tag in the
digital survey tool used to analyse and sort the mate‐
rial. Tags that were similar to each other were sorted
together in groups. These were in turn arranged in
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overarching categories that shared features. We expand
on this method below.
The surveywas open betweenMay 29 and August 12,
2019, and was carried out via the tool Survey Monkey
adhering to General Data Protection Regulation. It was
published online on Twitter and in groups on Facebook
that bring together climate‐committed individuals as
well as more specific groups such as Flight Free 2019/20
and We Stay on the Ground. Since we are interested
in people who stopped flying due to concerns about
climate change, we targeted groups with that profile.
This approach can be compared to the sampling of
Büchs (2017), who also looked for individuals within par‐
ticular interest groups. It should be stressed that we did
not seek to understand how people in general reason
around climate change and air travel, nor in understand‐
ing the motives of those who stopped flying for eco‐
nomic, medical, or other reasons. This study focuses on
those who actively changed flight behaviour due to con‐
cerns about climate change, and how they explain this
change of behaviour. The answers were anonymous and
in Swedish. We completed the translations into English.
The survey contained 15 questions, which included
both open text and limited choice responses, and cov‐
ered areas such as when did you fly or what kind of fly‐
ing did you do. There were also questions related to age,
gender, and education. A question central to this article
wasNo. 6: “Whatmade you change your behaviour?” This
was a multi‐choice question with the following options: a
specific occasion, more knowledge or a new insight, spe‐
cific arguments, role models or inspiring people, one or
several people close to me, travelling alternatives, the
debate, my social context or peer pressure, flight shame,
bad conscience, I don’t know, and other. Another cen‐
tral question was No. 7: “Tell us how it happened (open
text).” The survey method allowed us to gather a large
corpus of information in a relatively short time. A total
of 673 individuals completed the survey and our analy sis
builds primarily on the answers to question No 7. These
673 answers were of different length. Some were very
short, a few words, and others longer, several hundred
words. Regardless, they all contained at least one motive
for changing behaviour. Most answers contained several
motives. This means that our corpus comprised a great
number of motives to stop flying because of concern
about climate change. In traditional rhetorical critique,
one generally analyses texts that have already been pro‐
duced and have appeared in a particular context. Here we
do something less common in rhetoric, butmore common
in phenomenography: namely, organizing the production
of a material that we then study. The material is then ana‐
lysed in the sameway that rhetoricians examine artefacts.
We applied a phenomenological approach that seeks
to capture a variation, a diversity of existing ways of
thinking within a group. These ways of thinking are then
described and organised from likeness in categories of
description. The categories and their examples can then
be related or comparedwith each other. Such a set of cat‐
egories capturing the variation of reasoning concerning a
phenomenon is called an outcome space (Marton, 1986).
We combined the phenomenographical method with
topical analysis. In the material, we specifically searched
for topoi, prototypical thinking structures behind argu‐
ments, or recurring traits inmeaning‐making.When sort‐
ing the topoi in categories of description we could dis‐
cern motives such as certain types of knowledge, expe‐
rience, emotions, and values, which are the focus of
our discussion.
It is not possible for us as scholars to distinguish
between actual experiences, knowledge, or emotions,
and the way these are accounted for in the responses.
What we have are the written articulations of phe‐
nomena. From a rhetorical perspective, thinking is to a
high degree constituted linguistically, especially regard‐
ing problematic issues where one needs to deliberate
between different choices. By studying the linguistic
choices, we can discern key features in thinking. Some
of the articulated motives in the survey may be post‐
constructions, but even those are illuminating as they
reveal what is considered meaningful to the respondent.
It is also not possible to know if the motives given in
the survey are the real motives of the respondents. This
is true for most types of argumentative analysis and has
to be taken into consideration. However, we believe that
there are few reasons for the anonymous respondents
to make up motives, in particular since this survey dealt
with a change that the respondents wanted to make.
A distinct advantage of our design is that we refrain from
asking people about their intentions, which might very
well be separate from the outcome, but instead ask them
to account for something that has already happened.
The multi‐choice question preceding the open text ques‐
tion may have had an impact on the responses, which is
a possible weakness in the survey.
Topos analysis can be done deductively, using for
example a set of pre‐defined topoi and identifying their
occurrence. We instead worked inductively, considering
each answer for the topoi. For example, an answer stat‐
ing “For long, I have known that flying was bad for the
climate, but when I visited Bangladesh and saw the flood‐
ing of the homes of poor people, I realised the severity of
climate change and I cannot contribute to this unfairness
anymore” displays several topoi. One is that latent knowl‐
edge can become a realization through eye‐witnessing a
climate change incident, another topos is the recognition
of one’s own contribution to the climate crisis, a third
is to acknowledge a schism between personal behaviour
and the severity of climate change, and a fourth is a jus‐
tice perspective. None of these topoi are unique for rea‐
soning concerning climate issues; in fact, they occur in
reasoning around many issues, but they are prominent
in this material.
Topos analysis has been used to analyse the rhetoric
of climate change before (Cox, 1982; Farrell & Goodnight,
1981; Myerson & Rydin, 1996; Ross, 2013, 2017; Walsh,
2017; Walsh & Boyle, 2017). Concrete examples are
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Kerr (2017), who studied how uncertainty was used
by both environmental activists and companies in the
fracking debate; Ceccarelli (2011), who studied how the
same topos is used to give the appearance of scien‐
tific controversy and to postpone regulation; Walker and
Walsh (2012), who looked at how environmental activists
emphasize risks; andWalsh andPrelli (2017),who focused
on how scientific models are understood and used in cli‐
mate communication and by climate change deniers.
In our previous report on this study,we presented the
topoi found in detail and gave an abundance of examples
(Wolrath Söderberg & Wormbs, 2019). Here, we instead
focus on themotives discerned behind the topoi and give
a more overarching analysis of the process of change.
5. Results
Our inductive method resulted in a great number of pos‐
sible motives for change, including within single individ‐
uals; it was common to describe several rather than sin‐
gular motives, and these furthermore often made up a
process of change comprising several stages andmotives.
Below, we place these different types of motives, or
topoi, in nine different thematic categories, even if there
are great overlaps and connections between them, and
endwith the process of change. In thematerial, there are
also several more infrequentmotives that we leave aside
in this analysis.
5.1. Knowledge
The by far most common motive to stop or drastically
reduce flying was, in the wording of the respondents,
newknowledge. Among the pre‐selected reasons to stop,
four out of five ticked the box ‘knowledge’ and in the
open text answers more than half of the responses dealt
with knowledge. Some testified that they had had knowl‐
edge of the effects of flying on climate change for a
long time, but now had internalised it, which resulted in
change: “I have known, but just on the outside. When
I internalised it and it became part of me, there was
no going back.” This process is both described as suc‐
cessive and sudden. Knowledge accumulates over time,
somewhat uncomfortably, and then something happens
resulting in an insight. Some respondents realised the
severity of climate change, which made knowledge take
a new form or resulted in an “epiphany.” Several under‐
stood the relative weight of flying in relation to other
emission sources, for example as the proportion of their
own total footprint or a national or global average:
“I read that emissions from Swedes flying equal that of
car traffic. It made me realize how serious the problem
of flying is” represented a prototypical example, based
on the comparison. Sometimes this understanding had
come by way of using a climate calculator, which would
calculate impact based on one’s own data.
Common to many of these arguments and thought
structures was the economic idea of an account or a bud‐
get. When learning about a global average, whether at
present or representing an amount needed to meet the
Paris Agreement over time, private flying stood out for
many and was an obvious candidate in a quest to lower
personal emissions.
5.2. Experience
Tightly connected to knowledge and with great over‐
lap was the experience of climate change. The record‐
breaking Summer of 2018 constituted a bodily expe‐
rience of what many interpreted as climate change.
The smoke from burning forests, the dried‐out wells, and
the continuous heat were all experiences that respon‐
dents brought up as momentous in a process of aware‐
ness, providing a compelling insight, allowing knowl‐
edge to become real: “The warm and dry Summer of
2018 [with] forest fires and sinking levels of ground‐
water made me fear the consequences of future cli‐
mate change.” There were, however, also examples that
related to experiences, not in Sweden but elsewhere:
My last flightwas inNovember 2017 toBangladesh for
work. [T]he ocean makes Bangladesh so exposed to
rising sea levels. A few weeks earlier, colleagues had
been inDhaka,whichwas flooded, and they described
how they drifted in taxis with water up to the wind‐
shield. Their luggagewas in the trunk, all soaked. Imet
people there who will most likely be hit by climate
change, much harder than I. Yet I am the one causing
these emissions. I felt there and then that I did not
have any right to fly.
5.3. Emotions
The experience referred to above could also be
expressed in emotional language, like worry in the face
of lack of drinking water, or fear of fire and drought.
Often these emotions were part of the process of experi‐
ence that made knowledge real. But emotions were also
brought forward in other settings, not connected to an
experience. People wrote about anxiety, fear, disgust,
and sorrow, emerging after reading an article, watching
a film, or having a conversation: “In 2018, I realised the
seriousness of the damage from flying in earnest and it
gave me climate angst and panic.” Another kind of emo‐
tion had to do with mourning the loss of the journeys, or
lifestyle, one must refrain from: “Surfing in exotic places
and snowboarding in the Alps was part of my lifestyle.”
After having decided to quit flying, other emotions could
emerge, like relief: “I still have a positive feeling from
having made this decision.”
5.4. Moral
Prevalent in thematerialwere the responses that treated
flying as an ethical issue, belonging to the sphere of per‐
sonal morality. A great number of answers pointed to a
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“bad conscience” due to one specific trip or many histor‐
ical trips. But it could also be due to the perceived injus‐
tice that climate change results in, and the realization
of personal contributions to emissions. Some included
people on other continents or future generations when
assessing the ethics of flying. Feelings of guilt were often
expressed also in physical terms, as bodily manifested
stomach pain, the parable of an aching soul, or an inner
conflict that needed to be solved: “I felt disgusted by the
entire concept of flying and the unsustainable, egoistic
impact it has on climate.”
Others mentioned how they “stopped fooling” them‐
selves, pointing to a moment of realization and con‐
sequence. This argument suggests the importance of
consistency for rhetorical actors: You should “practice
what you preach.” Respondents could not justify their
actions to themselves anymore and needed to stop.
In fact, this version of the ethical argument was most
common in the survey: “What you cannot defend, you
should not do, and thus I stopped flying.”
To be consistent, avoiding an internal crack or cogni‐
tive dissonance, is also part of striving to be a role model
for others. Many related arguments talk about the possi‐
bility to change the norm and inspire others, which can‐
not be done if you are not walking the talk. The most
important audiences in this regard were future gener‐
ations, primarily children and grandchildren. The need
to be able to “look them in the eye” captures the
moral position.
There are also absolute and internal positions in no
need of an external audience. Some talk about responsi‐
bility, the need to do one’s “share” and contribute. Some
simply say that flying is unjust, building on the under‐
standing mentioned above that climate justice is key and
that they have no “right” to fly. Others do not want to
contribute more emissions, whether a specific tempera‐
ture target is reached or not. The important thing is to
act according to a moral conviction: “I simply could not
find any more good excuses to ignore my values.”
5.5. Children and the Future
As previously mentioned, children show up as an impor‐
tant audience that one must face and answer to:
“I decided [to stop flying] since I borrow the Earth from
my children and I want to be able to look my grandchil‐
dren in the eye.” They also carry knowledge and chal‐
lenge habits and norms: “Our daughter has taken the
lead. Now the entire family eats vegetarian, we drive
an electric car, and have stopped flying.” Children might
object to flying or contribute an argument concerning
a family vacation choice. At the same time, they figure
prominently as embodying the future: “I love travelling
to Asia, but I love my children more and therefore I will
stop flying until the fuel is fossil‐free.” Many responses
mention their own children or children close to them
as a turning point, putting things into perspective and
enabling change: “When my daughter was born, I had
no more excuses to fly.” To become a parent or see a
new life enter the world is brought forward as a motive
to change behaviour.
5.6. The Public Debate and Role Models
Many respondents claim to have been influenced by
the wider public debate. This debate took place in tra‐
ditional media, but just as often social media, and par‐
ticular groups are mentioned where news pieces might
have circulated. Contexts such as a Facebook group or
similar could offer social support. The debate itself could
also serve not just as an information provider but also as
an inspiration.
The most influential person and role model in the
material is Greta Thunberg. “I listened to Greta. I read
up. And I decided.” Greta Thunberg seems to have been
able to transform latent knowledge for some at the same
time as she reached new audiences. Thunberg’s mother,
Malena Ernman, is also frequently mentioned in the
material with the book she co‐authored and her decision
not to fly. Al Gore andAn Inconvenient Truth, Naomi Klein
and This Changes Everything, and David Attenborough’s
recent TV‐series are furthermore brought forward as
important sources of knowledge and inspiration.
5.7. The Social Context
Greta Thunberg, then a child, was only matched by other
anonymous children or children in the family. As men‐
tioned above, it was very common that children influ‐
enced the behaviour of our respondents: “My teenage
daughter said no to weekend trips” captures part of
a process of change. Also, other issues are mentioned,
such as a change in diet or a more sustainable lifestyle in
general. Other people close to respondents can also be
important, like a spouse, a sibling, or a friend. In those
interactions, how a question was posed is often men‐
tioned; empathy and courage are successful ingredients
in such a process.
Family can be of great help in behavioural change:
“When the debate became more intense and my hus‐
band gained more knowledge on the climate issue, we
decided together to stop flying.” Friends or colleagues
can have influence and lead the way. But a large num‐
ber of respondents referred to groups on social media as
decisive for their decisions: “It is not possible to fly when
you know how much CO2 it emits, to then see the flight
free campaign also makes the decision more lasting as
you know we are just becoming more and more.” It is
important to remember that the survey was conducted
in precisely such groups.
5.8. Shame
Finally, shame is mentioned in the material, but only
a few times. Conscience, and other notions having to
do with morality, is much more common, as discussed
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above. Shame is thus not very visible, neither in the
open‐text answers nor among the pre‐selected alterna‐
tives. Like with every word in the responses, we have
taken them at face value but at the same time looked
at their context and the argumentative structure. Shame
is often understood as a socially formed conscience.
Respondents mention many examples of social or media
discourses that apparently impacted their decision to
stop flying, either as role models or through norma‐
tive or moral discussions. There is a social dimension of
conscience, not mentioned as a negative feeling by the
respondents, but rather as a kind of support to be the
person one wants to be.
5.9. Alternatives
A large and distinct theme in the responses regards
motives related to the existence of alternatives to long‐
distance flying. This theme could reveal a push from fly‐
ing (e.g., “to fly is transport, not experience”), or a pull
towards train travel, as in “I had forgotten how fun it
is to travel by train.” The possibility to travel by train is
also filled with new meaning and slow travel is regarded
as more attractive: “Trains are nicer. I prefer the tempo
and think it is both more adventurous and pleasant.”
The time dimension can also be on a different scale:
“You do not gain time through flying, but lose a future for
coming generations,” illustrating that the trope of saving
time might not apply. Furthermore, one does not have
to travel far to experience something different, as there
are many parts of Sweden to visit: “Vacation in Sweden
instead. Simpler, cheaper, nicer!”
5.10. Process of Change
The motives analysed here can be brought together in
a process‐catalogue of how change might happen. Not
everyone in our study experiences everything, but the
experiences seem to occur in about the same order and
similar relations in the material. There are also several
responses where the stories are detailed. Below is one
example which illustrates the process, invoking several
of the motives that were previously mentioned:
I have long regarded myself as climate‐friendly and
done loads of things to lower my emissions. Then
I saw the figures on how much a flight emits and
realised that a flight to New York corresponds to all
my emission during an entire year if I live like I want
to this year. It feels like everything else I do for the cli‐
mate is of no use if I continue flying. Greta made me
raisemy ambitions because shemademedead scared
formy future. And I amgrateful for that. Even if Imight
not have a reasonable future since most people don’t
understand the gravity of the situation, I can still say
to the next generation that I did all I could, before it
was too late.
6. Discussion
By reducing or stopping flying, our respondents have
overcome the cognitive dissonance common for those
who strive to live a sustainable life but continue flying.
What we see in their given motives for change, how‐
ever, are often residues of that dissonance and a story
of transformation where several motives support each
other and interact. For example, strong emotions seem
to allow for new knowledge and a social context can help
behavioural change. Below we unpack the nine different
thematic categories and the process of change brought
forward above.
In this study, knowledge surfaces as the single most
important factor of any referred to by our respondents.
This is consistent with findings in Jacobson et al. (2020).
Important knowledge is particularly that which medi‐
ates the acuteness of the climate crisis and the size
and proportions of emissions that allow for compari‐
son. Also, and just as interesting, are the processes by
which knowledge is experienced and hits close to home.
When that happens, the earlier accumulated knowledge
becomes real and meaningful and internalised. This is
an interesting finding. There is a questioning of the
power of knowledge in the very description of the iner‐
tia in climate change as a gap between knowledge
and action. But there are also studies that more explic‐
itly criticize the possibility to bring about behavioural
changes by informing people about climate change,
the so‐called information‐deficit model (Bulkeley, 2000;
Moser & Dilling, 2011; Norgaard, 2011). These studies,
which strive to explain why people do not change, have
not completely rejected knowledge but rather empha‐
sised that knowledge alone is not enough. In this context,
the concept of knowledge is that of scientific discrete fac‐
tual knowledge. The knowledge concept that our respon‐
dents bring forward is more complex and integratedwith
experiential, emotional, moral, and social dimensions.
By and large, the aggregated process is often con‐
nected to strong emotions, like fear, worry, and pain.
Increased responsibility to others far away, both geo‐
graphically and temporally, are also emotionally chal‐
lenging. Before, during, and after the decision to stop
or reduce flying, feelings of loss and grief are men‐
tioned. The loss could be related to not being able to
meet friends and family or to abstain from activities
that were dear, if not existential. The decisions that
people have made are not easy, which is also appar‐
ent in the responses to a specific question in the survey
on hindrances to change. In general, it should come as
no surprise that change is hard and painful. As Moser
(2019, p. 152) recently put it, “deep change is—first
and foremost—experienced and processed emotionally”
(see also Randall, 2009, for a similar discussion on the
importance of emotional engagement).
The respondents in our survey seem to experience
strong agency through the action of stopping flying. They
refute the idea that their flight is a drop in the ocean
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and thus can be overlooked; they do not want to con‐
tribute even a single drop. For them, individual emissions
are real and the quickest way to lower them is to stop
flying. It seems to be empowering. This is truly interest‐
ing, particularly regarding the hypothesis that non‐action
can be partly explained by the fact that people are
scared into passivity and powerlessness (Stoknes, 2015).
Several studies have analysed the effect of appeals to
fear (or rather alarmist discourse) and concluded that it
does not work (Jost et al., 2007; Moser, 2007; O’Neill &
Nicholson‐Cole, 2009). This insight has been connected
to studies that have shown that hopeful messages can
promote action (Bennett et al., 2016; Stern, 2012), which
in turn often led to the simplified conclusion in the cli‐
mate communication discourse that one should commu‐
nicate hope rather than fear (Shanahan, 2007; Stoknes,
2015). Our findings show that fear can be a driving
force for behaviour change, which is supported also by
Kleres and Wettergren (2017). This applies to fear as an
emotion grounded in realizing the severity of climate
change, which is not the same as saying that alarmist
messages work.
Personal morality, often expressed in terms of con‐
science, is a category of particular interest and with dif‐
ferent forms. This is consistent with the findings of Büchs
(2017). One form of morality is justice, which can surface
when individual emissions are made visible and mate‐
rial, and when associated with the Paris Agreement or
a global average. This dimension seems to make knowl‐
edge ethical. Knowledge of what is sometimes called
inequality invokes moral action. The term ‘responsibility’
is recurrent, which puts the individual in relation to oth‐
ers, either other people far away or future generations.
Frequently this is connected to the maintenance of the
self as a consistent whole. However, it also expands to
the category of children and future generations.
The public debate and the social context are invoked
among the motives for change in our material. The
change process seems to be facilitated by a social con‐
text in which experience can be shared (e.g., groups on
the internet, at work, or at home), or by inspiring role
models and good examples. This is well known in the
health sector. However, identifying alternative ways to
live or be is also important. In fact, the process by which
knowledge becomes real may be facilitated by a support‐
ing social context. This would be in line with the theory
of cultural cognition where human rationality is believed
to be deeply social (Mercier & Sperber, 2017), and sup‐
ported by research on deliberative social change pro‐
cesses and learning (Wals & Rodela, 2014). Our respon‐
dents display a deliberative individual rationality, a ratio‐
nality that is emotionally grounded, morally responsible,
and socially dependent.
Shame, which has taken centre stage in the Swedish
context and, so to speak, acquiredwings of its own, is not
frequent nor articulated in the material. This is contrary
to the common understanding of what feelings might be
associated with stopping to fly (Mkono & Hughes, 2020).
Instead of invoking shame, our respondents talk about
conscience or sometimes guilt. As this is of interest in the
larger discussion on behavioural change, these findings
need unpacking.
Shame is arguably a feeling that comes from a mis‐
match between how the outside world views you and
how you view yourself. Shame can also be understood
as a tension between who you identify as and how you
act. Guilt, on the other hand, can be felt without an
audience and be entirely an internal experience. Guilt
appears when people do things they consider morally
problematic, but without experiencing it as a threat to
their perceived identity (Bedford & Hwang, 2003).
Shame, understood as a social emotion, is rather
absent in the material. However, it is clear that the
moral understanding of and reasoning about flying has
been impacted by a changed public and social discourse.
The social discourse of our respondents is described as
supportive rather than shaming. It is also probable that
our respondents, who have stopped flying, are less likely
to relate to shame. Shame as an issue of identity res‐
onates with looking at the internal deliberation as a con‐
versation between the person you want to be and the
choices that you make. From this viewpoint, the disso‐
nance is not only cognitive but might also threaten one’s
perceived identity. This is for instance visible in the wish
to look “future children in the eye.” The two ways of
understanding shame come together as two dimensions
of the same emotion; the topoi include internalization of
the gaze and expectation of an ‘other.’
Guilt, felt when failing to meet one’s moral standard,
is abundant in the answers that bring up moral dimen‐
sions. Although a social context is discernible, it is not
necessarily integrated or highlighted as a motive stated
by the respondent. Respondents instead often view
themselves as autonomous and bring forward motives
stressing responsibility or justice.
Even though guilt and shame can be intellectually
and emotionally separated, it might be more useful
to view them as two perspectives on the same phe‐
nomenon. This would correspond to a rhetorical under‐
standing of meaning‐making as simultaneously social
and identity‐building. Furthermore, in the Swedish con‐
text, the words shame and guilt often come together
(‘skam’ and ‘skuld’) and there are reasons to believe that
the distinction is not withheld in the public discourse.
There are also reasons to conflate them according to
a media logic that privileges strong negative feelings
over empathetic reasoning. To feel shame is indeedmost
disturbing and deeply negative, and thus talking about
flying and shame is a functional way of colouring the
entire discourse. To many of our respondents, the moral
dimension is crucial, but the social discourse is support‐
ive rather than shaming.
To our knowledge, there are thus far no attribution
studies that can assert that those who stopped flying are
the ones primarily using the term flygskam, nor engage in
flight shaming, as some scholars have suggested (Mkono,
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2020). On the contrary, the We Stay on the Ground
movement explicitly works to avoid shame (Rosén, 2019).
We believe it is more likely to be used by flyers to charac‐
terize and thereby dismiss a potentially disruptive move‐
ment, but more research is needed.
The last thematic category in our list, alternatives,
can also be seen as part of a process of change, just like
the social context. In theory, these alternatives exist to
all, and the literature on sustainable tourism illustrates
the complexity of the larger issue (Becken, 2019; Pyke,
Hartwell, Blake, & Hemingway, 2016), but the alterna‐
tives become real only when it is possible to assess them
as alternatives. Then they support the original issue of
stopping flying. We suggest that it is not only the will
to change behaviour that affects the willingness to find
alternatives, but that the awareness of attractive alterna‐
tives also affects the ability to take on new knowledge.
Finally, as for the process of change, this is analo‐
gous to Vladimir Propp’s structural elements of a story.
He mapped 31 basic functions of a fairy tale. Not every‐
one is included in every story, but those who are often
appear in a specific order and relationship to each other:
The hero leaves the home. The hero is warned against
some action. The hero does not listen to the command.
The villain enters the story. The villain seeks information
and later deceives the victim, etc. (Propp, 1968). We can
discern a story of change in our material of separate
arguments. This relates well to the study by Jacobson
et al. (2020), where they describe a “tipping point” when
awareness evokes negative emotions leading to a deci‐
sion to reduce or quit flying and discern the workings of
conscience and social discourse.
7. Conclusion
Contrary to existing understanding, knowledge and fear
are brought forward as important factors for change
among those who stopped or drastically reduced flying
for climate reasons in this study. This underscores the
importance of further studyingwhich knowledge enables
action, and if and how it can be promoted. The inner
emotional conflicts that climate change brings about are
also important. Moreover, the role of social context is
underscored. Children, in particular, serve as those who
bring knowledge, awaken conscience, demand consis‐
tency, and embody the future. It is particularly interest‐
ing to see how these dimensions—knowledge, emotions,
and social context—speak to conscience, and interact
with a sense of individual responsibility.
Finally, the sense of moral agency among our respon‐
dents is noteworthy. Not only is it contrary to a wide‐
spread assumption on maximizing personal gain, but it is
also rewarding to watch a transition process take form.
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